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Abstract
This paper uses a semi-structural dynamic modelling approach to investigate asymmetric monetary
transmission in Europe. A system of equations containing reaction functions for monetary policy,
output and inflation equations is simultaneously estimated for France, Germany, and Italy.
Extensive cross equation tests show that relatively large differences in simulated impulse responses
are still consistent with the notion that the transmission mechanism is homogeneous across the three
major EMU countries. However, monetary policy impulses show a relatively stronger effect on the
output gap in Italy and Germany. Out-of-sample tests do not find a structural break in the
transmission mechanisms prior to EMU.
JEL classification: E52, F41
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1. Introduction
The creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) raises the question whether the common
monetary policy has the same impact in all member countries. Differences in the transmission
mechanisms in Europe imply that uniform policy impulses by the European Central Bank (ECB)
lead to asymmetric business cycles across the EMU. These result in adjustment problems and may
create tensions in the decision-making process of the ECB (see, e.g., Aksoy et al., 2002).
Prior to EMU, there has been a considerable convergence in the cyclical behaviour of the EMU
member countries (ECB, 1999). Furthermore, after the establishment of EMU some further
convergence in transmission mechanisms is expected to take place (Clausen, 2001). Nevertheless,
some differences in transmission patterns are likely to persist (Cecchetti, 1999; Mojon, 2000).
Furthermore, recent differences in growth rates across the EMU as well as the prospect of EU
enlargement to Eastern Europe with countries having very different transmission profiles keep the
interest in asymmetric monetary transmission in Europe.
Reflecting the importance for ECB policy-making, numerous studies deal with this issue. A
considerable part of the early empirical evidence has been surveyed by Dornbusch et al. (1998) and
Guiso et al. (1999). Dornbusch et al. define three basic requirements for empirical studies related to
the pre-EMU period in order to provide valuable information on monetary transmission after the
formation of EMU. First, the direct impact from a change in interest rates on output and prices has
to be separable from the indirect impact via exchange rates. This exchange rate channel has to be
decomposable into an intra-EMU and an extra-EMU channel, since the former disappeared with the
establishment of EMU. Otherwise, asymmetries in policy transmission might be identified that
basically result from intra-European exchange rate changes. Second, in order to model the common
monetary policy in Europe the empirical set-up has to allow for a simultaneous change of monetary
policy in all EMU countries. Third, the empirical approach has to provide information on the
statistical significance of asymmetries in the transmission mechanism. As both surveys illustrate,
numerous previous studies on asymmetric monetary transmission in Europe fail to meet these
requirements. Even the recent study by Angeloni et al. (2002) does not contain statistical tests of
differences in estimated coefficients or simulated impulse responses.
A fourth condition can be added. The creation of EMU and the corresponding change in the policy
regime may result in a structural break in the transmission mechanisms in Europe. Some authors
believe that financial market efficiency suggests a rapid adjustment of the behaviour of economic
agents after entering the new monetary regime (see Arnold and de Vries, 2000). Consequently,
analyses using pre-EMU data provide very limited information for the ECB. While we expect some
convergence in transmission mechanisms across the EMU, these adjustments are likely to take place2
gradually (see Hayo, 1999 or Clausen, 2001). In this case, historical data and related empirical
studies provide useful information about the transmission mechanism after the formation of EMU.
2. Methodology and data
This paper uses a semi-structural dynamic modelling approach for assessing the degree of
asymmetric monetary transmission in Europe. This approach avoids problems related to
constructing conclusive statistical cross-country tests that are a typical weakness of VAR studies
(such as in Clements et al., 2001, Ehrmann, 2000, Peersman and Smets, 2001). In most studies
At the same time, statistical problems as evident in more structural approaches (see Dornbusch et
al., 1998 or Peersman and Smets, 1999) can be addressed by providing a consistent but more
flexible dynamic modelling framework that is a reasonably accurate reflection of the data
generating process (see Hendry, 1995).
Our empirical design draws upon recent developments in macro-econometric modelling: Central
bank behaviour is modelled using reaction functions in the spirit of Taylor (1993) where interest
rate setting responds to the output gap and to inflation. This approach receives considerable
empirical support not only in the US (e.g. Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999) but also in the euro area
(Peersman and Smets, 1999; Gerlach and Schnabel, 2000). The specification of the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy draws upon Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). An output gap
equation models the demand side and an inflation equation represents the supply side in the
respective economies. The output gap is driven by interest rates, exchange rate developments, and
foreign lagged output gaps. Inflation is governed by the current output gap and lagged inflation.
Our analysis focuses on France, Germany and Italy as the most important EMU member countries,
which together account for almost three quarters of aggregate European output. The overall system
consists therefore of nine equations. The model is estimated using the technique of full-information
maximum likelihood (FIML). The system context allows for extensive tests of cross equation
hypotheses. The semi-structural dynamic modelling approach employed in this paper to assess the
effects of monetary policy differs from VAR models in several respects. First, as a result of the
large number of variables we do not treat all variables as endogenous. Second, we do not include all
variables in all equations to achieve identification. Third, we do not impose the same lag length for
each variable in each equation due to limited degrees of freedom. Fourth, testing coefficient
estimates is statistically possible and makes economic sense.
The quarterly data start in 1979 – introduction of the European Monetary System (EMS) – and end
before the establishment of EMU in 1998. We use the money market rate, seasonally adjusted
quarterly data for real GDP, and consumer prices from the IMF International Financial Statistics3
database (March 2001 CD-Rom). The disaggregated exchange rate variables are taken from
Deutsche Bundesbank (1998). The exchange rate variable is exactly decomposed into the effective
exchange rate vis-à-vis the members of EMU and the rest of the world (excluding other EU
members).
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In order to derive the output gap, we apply a Hodrick-Prescott filter to the GDP series to extract a
trend from the data. This trend is subtracted from the original GDP series, divided by the trend
estimate and multiplied by 100 in order to convert values to percent. Inflation is the rate of change
of the consumer price index with respect to the previous quarter. The exchange rate variables are
expressed in natural logarithms and computed as moving averages over the last four quarters in
order to dampen the impact of temporary fluctuations in the exchange rate. Unit root tests (not
shown) find short-term interest rates, output gaps, inflation rates and the effective exchange rates to
be stationary. In the estimation, the econometric model is therefore treated as stationary.
3. Estimating monetary policy effects
The interpretation of the estimation results and the tests for the statistical significance of
asymmetries require the underlying system to pass standard diagnostic tests. Initial estimations of
the full system showed problems with outliers causing non-normality of the residuals. The inclusion
of several impulse dummies related to the reunification of Germany and to realignments in the EMS
removed these problems. Insignificant lags in the interest rate and inflation equations were removed
based on a consistent testing-down procedure at a 5% significance level. To control for possible
data mining and to check whether a structural break occurred prior to the establishment of EMU, we
performed out-of-sample evaluations of our model. Despite the limitations in the degrees of
freedom, we reserved eight quarters for Chow-tests for structural stability. Since we use lagged
variables, the model is estimated over the period 1980:1 to 1996:4.
Table 1: Diagnostics of the system
AR(2)-test Normality Chow1-test Chow2-test
Vector statistics F(162,276)=1.23 Chi
2(18)=22.08 F(72,58)=1.51 F(72,58)=1.22
Notes: * and ** indicate statistical significance at a level of 5% and 1%, respectively. Chow1-test is the standard Chow-
test. Chow2-test takes parameter uncertainty into account. AR(2)-test is an LM-test for autocorrelation containing two
lags.
                                               
1 EMU refers to the three largest countries, France, Germany, and Italy. Our treatment of the exchange rate channel is
superior to previous studies. Traditionally, the exchange rate channel is modelled asymmetrically using only the DM-
Dollar exchange rate for Germany and the bilateral exchange rates with the DM for the other European countries (see
e.g. Dornbusch et al., 1998).4
Table 1 displays standard diagnostic statistics for the baseline nine-equation system.
2 These tests do
not show any problems of misspecification. There is no evidence of autocorrelation or non-
normality of the residuals. The out-of-sample Chow tests do not indicate instability of the estimates.
Hence, the model does not experience a major structural break prior to EMU.
In order to address possible violations of the homoscedasticity assumption, heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors (White, 1980) have been computed. In general, these do not indicate any
problems, and, in view of the known small-sample problems of the White-estimates, we generally
continue to use normal standard errors in our interpretation of the results.
Whereas the complete system is estimated simultaneously, we present the actual results for output
gaps, interest rates, and inflation rates in three groups in order to facilitate the cross-country
comparison. Table 2 contains the estimates for the output gaps.
Table 2: FIML-system: Output gap equations
France Coeff. S.E. Germany Coeff. S.E. Italy Coeff. S.E.
Fintt-1 0.044 0.048 GIntt-1 -0.384
(*)
0.206 IIntt-1 0.012 0.055
Fintt-2 -0.141
*
0.064 GIntt-2 0.480 0.299 IIntt-2 -0.065 0.066
Fintt-3 0.101 0.064 GIntt-3 -0.173 0.258 IIntt-3 0.022 0.066







0.232 FGapt-1 -0.003 0.117
FGapt-2 0.125 0.114 FGapt-2 0.421
(*)
0.215 FGapt-2 0.120 0.116
GGapt-1 0.001 0.060 GGapt-1 0.542
**
0.116 GGapt-1 0.081 0.059
GGapt-2 -0.138
*





0.121 IGapt-1 0.257 0.230 IGapt-1 0.464
**
0.126
IGapt-2 -0.110 0.114 IGapt-2 -0.548
*
0.219 IGapt-2 0.012 0.114
FEMUt-2 -34.40
**





8.029 GEMUt-3 -16.59 13.04 IEMUt-3 21.74
**
7.490
FROWt-2 -8.216 11.82 GROWt-2 21.95 13.27 IROWt-2 19.73
*
7.875






Ó 0.430 0.797 0.474
                                               
2 The estimation and the statistical tests were performed with PC FIML 9.0. See Doornik and Hendry (1997) for a
detailed description of the tests.5
Notes: (*), *, ** indicate statistical significance at a level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
The labels F, G, and I represent France, Germany, and Italy, respectively. The short-term interest
rate is denoted by Int, the output gap by Gap, the inflation rate by Infl, and the effective exchange
rates by EMU and ROW. For Germany, we included a dummy from 1990:1 to 1993:1 to account for
the post-reunification period.
A priori, we expect negative signs for the impact of interest rates and exchange rates, while the sign
for the lagged own and foreign output gaps are not determined. Output gaps are affected by two
opposing influences. On the one hand, we expect a positive transmission of shocks via trade
linkages. On the other hand, an interest rate response to a shock in one country affects another
country with an opposite sign. Whether cyclical spill-overs across the EMU members turn out to be
positive or negative thus depends on the relative strength of trade versus interest rate effects. Apart
from that, symmetric (asymmetric) demand shocks may lead to positive (negative) signs of the
foreign output gaps.
The interest rate variables are found to be significantly negative but at different lags. The own
lagged output gaps are always significant and positive, with the strongest effect in France and
considerably smaller but similar effects in Germany and Italy. The cross-country lagged output gaps
are often insignificant, sometimes significant even with a wrong sign, which means that it is hard to
detect empirically reliable output spill-over effects within the EMU. Thus, abstracting from the
influence of symmetric or asymmetric demand shocks, trade effects and interest rate effects appear
to be of broadly similar size. The exchange rate variables also display sign reversals at different
lags.
Overall, we find statistically significant results for both lagged and foreign output gaps, interest
rates and exchange rates in each national gap equation. From a technical point of view, the
existence of significant lags at different lengths with opposite signs suggests unexplained dynamics
being picked up by the lags. Deletion of one lag generally leads to a loss of significance of the other
lag as well.
Table 3 presents the estimates of the interest rate reaction functions. We assume that the current
output gap and the current inflation rate determine the level of the interest rate. We also allow for
interest rate smoothing (up to lag four) and one outlier per equation. As an “anchor” interest rate,
i.e., the rate prevailing when all other variables are equal to their target values, we include a
constant term in the German equation. For the other countries, we do not include a constant term
but instead the German interest rate. The underlying assumption is that due to the existence of the
EMS, German interest rates affect other member’s interest rates. Robustness checks for France
show that the impact of the contemporaneous German interest rate is significantly positive while an6
additional constant term is not significant. The interest rate linkage with Germany is weaker in the
case of Italy. This is unsurprising, given the fact that the Lira devalued several times over our
sample period and the corresponding exchange rate band exceeded the one between the Franc and
the DM.
Table 3: FIML-system: Interest rate reaction functions







































Ó 0.779 0.431 0.829
Notes: (*), *, ** indicate statistical significance at a level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Regarding the other core variables in the reaction function, we obtain for France significant effects
for the output gap and the inflation rate. The Italian reaction function looks similar but shows a
larger influence of output and inflation. In Germany, the output gap does not have a significant
influence on interest rates, while the coefficient on inflation is relatively large. In addition, a
significant dummy in the German equation relates to the reunification. The dummy variables for
France and Italy capture the October 1981 realignment of the Franc and the EMS crisis in 1992,
respectively. These events turned out to be insignificant in the German reaction function. This can
be interpreted as further evidence of German dominance in the EMS (see, e.g., Wyplosz, 1989, von
Hagen and Fratianni, 1990).
Table 4 presents the estimates for the inflation equations. In all countries, the output gap has a
significant impact on inflation. In France, it is slightly above the 10%-significance level but
considerably lower when heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors are used (p-value: 0.079). The
inflation dynamics are remarkably homogeneous with significant and similar coefficients occurring
at the same lag length (except the third lag in the Italian equation). Several impulse dummies in the
French inflation equation capture outliers. All dummies can be related to devaluations toward the7
DM within the EMS.
3 In the case of Germany, we need one dummy to capture reunification.
Overall, the inflation processes are similar across countries.
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Table 4: FIML-system: Inflation rate equations


































Ó 0.296 0.573 0.487
Notes: (*), *, ** indicate statistical significance at a level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Employing our baseline model, we can illustrate the nature of spill-over effects in the EMS by
simulating an asymmetric economic shock. We use the German reunification as an example. We
assume that this event raised the German output gap by about 1.5 percentage points due to
government transfer programs and higher consumption in East Germany. At the same time, the
inflation rate increased by about 2 percentage points. Implementing these two shocks
simultaneously in our model generates the impulse responses displayed in figure 1.
We observe an initial increase in the German interest rates by about 1.5 percentage points. The
output gap falls after the initial positive impulse of 1.5 percentage points until it reaches a minimum
after three years. German interest rates start falling again and output recovers such that the output
gap reaches its starting value after about five years. German inflation decreases cyclically after the
initial shock until it reaches its original value after approximately four years.
In the other countries, the subsequent developments are primarily governed by the national reaction
functions. The difference between the tight connection of the Franc with the DM and the much
weaker link of the Lira is pronounced. The French interest rate development follows Germany’s
lead relatively closely. In Italy, the direct impact of the German interest rate hike only occurs at the
                                               
3 The French Franc was devalued against the DM on 5 October 1981 by 8.8%, 14 June 1982 by 10.6%, and 12 January
1987 by 3%.
4 We checked the robustness of our results by adding oil prices expressed in national currency to the inflation equations.
We found the corresponding elasticities to be statistically significant, but quantitatively unimportant. Our above
conclusions remain intact. In the following, we continue to refer to the more parsimonious specification due to limits in
the degrees of freedom.8
fourth lag and with a quantitatively much smaller impact.
5 The macroeconomic development in
Italy is therefore basically a response to the cyclical spill-over from Germany and France. Since
these two countries exert a negative influence, at least after the primary positive impulse from
Germany is over, the Italian output gap deteriorates. Then, both France and Italy’s output gaps
fluctuate around zero until they converge back to the starting values. In Germany, the response is
somewhat faster. These fluctuations are also transmitted to inflation in France and Italy. Here, a
deflationary period is followed by an inflationary period, analogous with the output gap cycle. In
Germany, we find again that the adjustment back to equilibrium is much more rapid.










































IINF (GGAP 1.5% & GINFL 2%) 
To summarise, German reunification caused real costs for France and Italy in terms of cyclical
variations of output and inflation. Both countries experience a contractionary and deflationary
impact. While this result is not very surprising for France due to interest rate interaction, we find
that the outcome is not very different for Italy, which does not follow German interest rates closely.
                                               
5 Recalculating the impulse responses after eliminating this link leaves the picture almost unchanged.9
Note that our results differ from estimates by the Deutsche Bundesbank, where – based on a
different methodology – the positive trade effect overcompensated the interest rate effect (see
Deutsche Bundesbank, 1992).
The observed differences in the adjustment patterns in Europe result as a combination of
asymmetric shocks, different interest rate responses by the central banks, and asymmetries in the
transmission profiles in the three countries. Furthermore, they may not be statistically significant.
We need to test for asymmetric monetary transmission in Europe.
4. Testing for asymmetric transmission
We use Wald-statistics to test for the existence of asymmetric transmission in the econometric
system. Our dynamic model allows us to test for asymmetries at different time horizons. We restrict
our attention to the effects after one quarter, one year and in the long-run. We acknowledge that our
model is not specifically designed for the analysis of impact or long-run effects. For the former,
data at a higher frequency are needed, while for the latter one ought to incorporate long-run
relationships. Table 5 presents the respective coefficients and test results regarding the significance
of interest rate variables in the output gaps. This is done country by country as well as jointly.
Table 5: Testing for interest rate effects on output gaps
France Germany Italy Joint




























2(1) = 17.2 Chi
2(3) = 23.3
**
The impact effect is insignificant in France and Italy, while Germany shows a significant and strong
negative effect. Testing all three coefficients jointly against zero leads to a non-significant outcome.
The picture changes already at the one-year horizon. Now we obtain significant test results at the
individual and the joint level. The tests concerning the long-run effect requires non-linear
restrictions. Although the statistical significance declines in all countries, for example, the p-value
in France is 0.108, the interest rate shock is found to have negative long-run effects. Monetary
policy is not neutral in the long-run. This may result from the fact that our model does not really
capture a “true” long-run. Taken together, these results suggest that the ECB can rely on an10
effective interest rate channel in all three countries and in the euro area as a whole. The exchange
rate channel of monetary policy transmission does not seem to play a critical role (see also Angeloni
et al., 2002). This holds in particular in the medium term, which is the most relevant one for
practical policy purposes.
Table 6 investigates the degree of asymmetry in the interest rate channel across the three EMU
member countries. Looking at the impact effect, the difference in the policy impact between France
and Italy is not significant (Chi
2(1) = 0.20). The German impact effect, which is known from table 5
to be negative, differs significantly from Italy and almost significantly from France (p-value: 0.11).
In conclusion, the impact effect of ECB policy in Germany is significantly stronger than in the other
two countries.
Table 6: Testing for asymmetric interest rate effects on output gaps
Fra versus Ger Fra versus Ita Ger versus Ita
Impact Chi
2(1) = 2.50 Chi










2(1) = 0.79 Chi
2(1) = 0.56 Chi
2(1) = 0.24
Long-run with bilateral spill-overs Chi
2(1) = 1.47 Chi
2(1) = 0.56 Chi
2(1) = 0.01
After one year, the cumulative influence of interest rate coefficients in the French output gap
deviates significantly from the one in Germany. In conjunction with the results in table 5, the effect
in France is found to be significantly smaller. The difference is, in the statistical sense, even more
significant in the comparison between France and Italy despite the fact that the difference between
the actual estimates is smaller than in the comparison of France and Germany. There is no
significant difference between Germany and Italy. Overall, monetary policy effects at the one-year
horizon are similar in Germany and Italy, while the effects in France are smaller in absolute terms.
The differences in the long-run effects are not significant.
These tests do not consider output spill-over effects within Europe. In each country, foreign output
gap variables entered the respective national gap equation (see table 2). Hence, changes in the
output gap in one country following a monetary policy shock are transmitted to the other countries
via the respective gap terms in the foreign output equations. We take these spill-over effects into11
account in our analysis of the long-run effect. Again, we find no significant differences among
EMU member countries.
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Moving to the determinants of interest rate policy, we initially look at the short-run importance of
the output gap and inflation in the reaction functions and test for differences in their importance.
Again, this is done within and across countries. Table 7 presents the results for the within country
tests. The first line gives the ratio between the two coefficients. The second line lists the results of
our tests against unity, which means equal weights of both policy goals in the reaction function. The
test statistics are insignificant in France and Italy. However, in Germany the difference is significant
(p-value: 0.115) indicating that in Germany fighting inflation is more important in interest rate
setting than the output gap. This result differs from outcomes of single-equation studies on reactions
functions, e.g. Clarida et al. (1998).
Table 7: Testing restrictions on short-run reaction functions within countries
France Germany Italy
Gap/inflation weight ratio 0.76 0.17 1.22





Tests for asymmetries across countries may refer to the absolute or to the relative weighting of
policy goals. The absolute weights are interesting because they determine the size of the interest rate
responses to movements in the output gap and inflation. The relative weights of policy goals are
important because they provide information how central banks are likely to react in the presence of
supply shocks.
Table 8 contains the outcome of the short-run tests across countries. Regarding the absolute weight
of the output gap, the tests show significant differences for all country pairs. As known from table
3, the Italian weight on the output gap is the largest, followed by France and Germany. For
inflation, we find France and Germany to have similar absolute values, both being larger than in
Italy. Tests of asymmetric relative weights of the output gap and inflation are insignificant for
France and Germany as well as for France and Italy. However, the Null that the relative weights in
Germany and Italy are equal can be rejected at the 1% level. To summarise, according to the short-
                                               
6 For this reason, impulse responses based on VAR models investigating only national policy impulses without
international output repercussions may be very misleading. The inclusion of output spill-overs in our model tends to
dampen differences in output developments. Thus, investigating asymmetric monetary transmission in a system context
is likely to lead to smaller differences in output developments than single-country studies.12
run coefficients, Germany places the most emphasis on inflation, followed by France and with Italy
at the end of the spectrum.
Table 8: Testing restrictions on short-run reaction functions across countries
Output Gap Inflation Rate















Difference in Gap/inflation ratios (short-run equal to long-run)







The focus on the short-run may be misleading because short-run coefficients mix optimal policy
responses with respect to output gap and inflation with a parameter reflecting interest rate
smoothing.
7 Therefore, it is interesting to look at the long-run responses for the three countries.
Table 9 provides static long-run solutions with respect to output gap, inflation and the nominal
“anchor”. The nominal “anchor” gives the nominal interest rate when the actual output gap and
inflation rate equal their target values. For France and Italy, these were derived by assuming that the
target values in Germany are met.
Table 9: Long-run reaction functions
Output gap Inflation rate Nominal “anchor”
France 1.73 2.28 3.26
Germany 0.49 2.89 4.02
Italy 2.46 2.02 0.48
Regarding the long-run coefficients, our test results across countries are similar to our short-run
results and are therefore omitted. Germany places the highest emphasis on deviations from the
inflation targets and the lowest emphasis on deviations from the output gap, with France in the
                                               
7 See, e.g., Judd and Rudebusch (1998). Note that the estimated policy weights can not be interpreted as a measure of
policy preferences concerning output and inflation. The optimal policy response depends not only on policy preferences
but also on the structure of the economy and the nature of shocks (see Clarida et al., 1999). Cecchetti and Ehrmann
(1999) discuss in a simpler setting in reference to the Taylor rule how to trace policy preferences from macroeconomic
outcomes.13
middle and Italy at the other side of the spectrum.
8 We conclude that the Bundesbank is the most
“conservative” of the analysed central banks, followed by the Banque de France and the Banca
d’Italia.
Finally, we test for asymmetries in the impact of the output gap on inflation (Table 10). The impact
can be measured in the short-run and in the long-run. Testing all three short-run coefficients jointly,
we find them to be significantly different from zero. Comparing France and Germany reveals that in
Germany the output gap has a significantly larger influence on inflation. This difference is not
significant, though, in the comparison between these two countries and Italy. When we impose all
three equality restrictions simultaneously, the Null can only be rejected at the 10% level.
Table 10: Testing short-run restrictions on the output gap in the national inflation equations









Table 11 gives long-run coefficients as well as significance tests. The long-run coefficients are
generally larger than the short-run coefficients. The output gap has still the strongest influence on
German inflation. However, France and Italy switched positions, with Italy showing the weakest
long-run influence of the output gap on inflation. The long-run impact in France is not significant
(p-value = 0.17) while Germany and Italy display significant long-run effects.
Table 11: Testing long-run restrictions on the output gap in the national inflation equations
Joint zero restrictions France Germany Italy









Asymmetric long-run effects: Fra vs. Ger Fra vs. Ita Ger vs. Ita
Chi
2(1) = 0.74 Chi
2(1) = 1.81 Chi
2(1) = 0.28
The latter tests involve the question whether there are long-run differences between the countries
regarding the influence of the output gap on inflation. Here we do not encounter any significant
                                               
8 Note that the long-run coefficient on the inflation rate is larger than unity in all three equations. This ensures that
interest rate changes as a result of inflation rate deviations from target actually affect real interest rates in the right
direction and that the system is dynamically stable.14
results and we have to conclude that in the long-run, inflation mechanisms in these countries are
symmetric.
5. Conclusions
Two conclusions emerge from our study: first, relatively large differences in simulated impulse
responses are still consistent with the view that the transmission mechanism is homogeneous across
the EMU countries. Tests for the statistical significance of asymmetries reveal that differences in
the estimated coefficients are often not statistically significant, especially over the long-run. At the
same time, we find that the output response after a monetary shock in France is significantly smaller
compared to Germany and Italy in the medium-run. Since the medium-run is most relevant for
monetary policy transmission, we cannot reject the notion that a common impulse from the ECB
will have different effects in EMU member countries. Further convergence may occur as a result of
EMU membership (see Frankel and Rose, 1998) but if, when and how that comes about remains to
be seen.
Second, our out-of-sample tests suggest that the transmission mechanisms in Europe did not
experience a major structural break prior to the establishment of EMU. The finding is relevant for
economic policy, as it suggests the absence of a strong convergence effect. This leaves two
interpretations: either there was a sharp-structural break only after the establishment the EMU came
about (see Arnold and de Vries, 2000 for such a conjecture), or there will be a more gradual
adjustment to the new economic regime over time making it more difficult for stability tests to
clearly detect a structural break at a point in time (see Hayo, 1999 for some arguments). In the latter
case, historical data and related empirical studies continue to provide useful information for the
ECB about the transmission mechanism after the establishment of EMU. An analysis of this
question is on our agenda for further research.15
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